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1. Introduction
Modern economic analysis consists largely in building abstract mathematical models and
deriving familiar results from ever sparser modeling assumptions is considered as a
theoretical contribution. Why do economists spend so much time and effort in deriving
same old results from slightly different assumptions rather than trying to come up with
new and exciting hypotheses? We claim that this is because the process of refining
economic  models  is  essentially  a  form  of  robustness  analysis.  The robustness of
modeling results with respect to particular modeling assumptions, parameter values or
initial conditions plays a crucial role for modeling in economics for two reasons. First,
economic models are difficult to subject to straightforward empirical tests for various
reasons. Second, the very nature of economic phenomena provides little hope of ever
making the modeling assumptions completely realistic. Robustness analysis is therefore a
natural methodological strategy for economists because economic models are based on
various idealizations and abstractions which make at least some of their assumptions
unrealistic (Wimsatt 1987; 1994a; 1994b; Mäki 2000; Weisberg 2006b). The importance
of robustness considerations in economics ultimately forces us to reconsider many
commonly held views on the function and logical structure of economic theory.
Given that much of economic research praxis can be characterized as robustness analysis,
it is somewhat surprising that philosophers of economics have only recently become
2interested in robustness. William Wimsatt has extensively discussed robustness analysis,
which  he  considers  in  general  terms  as triangulation via independent ways of
determination.  According to Wimsatt, fairly varied processes or activities count as ways
of determination: measurement, observation, experimentation, mathematical derivation
etc. all qualify. Many ostensibly different epistemic activities are thus classified as
robustness analysis. In a recent paper, James Woodward (2006) distinguishes four
notions  of  robustness.  The  first  three  are  all  species  of  robustness  as  similarity  of  the
result under different forms of determination. Inferential robustness refers to the idea that
there are different degrees to which inference from some given data may depend on
various auxiliary assumptions, and derivational robustness to whether a given theoretical
result depends on the different modelling assumptions. The difference between the two is
that the former concerns derivation from data, and the latter derivation from a set of
theoretical assumptions. Measurement robustness means triangulation of a quantity or a
value  by  (causally)  different  means  of  measurement.  Inferential,  derivational  and
measurement robustness differ with respect to the method of determination and the goals
of the corresponding robustness analysis. Causal robustness, on the other hand, is a
categorically different notion because it concerns causal dependencies in the world, and it
should not be confused with the epistemic notion of robustness under different ways of
determination.
In Woodward’s typology, the kind of theoretical model-refinement that is so common in
economics constitutes a form of derivational robustness analysis. However, if Woodward
(2006) and Nancy Cartwright (1991) are right in claiming that derivational robustness
does not provide any epistemic credence to the conclusions, much of theoretical model-
building in economics should be regarded as epistemically worthless. We take issue with
this position by developing Wimsatt’s (1981) account of robustness analysis as
triangulation via independent ways of determination. Obviously, derivational robustness
in economic models cannot be a matter of entirely independent ways of derivation,
because the different models used to assess robustness usually share many assumptions.
Independence of a result with respect to modelling assumptions nonetheless carries
epistemic weight by supplying evidence that the result is not an artefact of particular
3idealizing modelling assumptions. We will argue that although robustness analysis,
understood as systematic examination of derivational robustness, is not an empirical
confirmation procedure in any straightforward sense, demonstrating that a modelling
result is robust does carry epistemic weight by guarding against error and by helping to
assess the relative importance of various parts of theoretical models (cf. Weisberg
2006b). While we agree with Woodward (2006) that arguments presented in favour of
one kind of robustness do not automatically apply to other kinds of robustness, we think
that the epistemic gain from robustness derives from similar considerations in many
instances of different kinds of robustness.
In contrast to physics, economic theory itself does not tell which idealizations are truly
fatal or crucial for the modeling result and which are not. Economists often proceed on a
preliminary hypothesis or an intuitive hunch that there is some core causal mechanism
that ought to be modeled realistically. Turning such intuitions into a tractable model
requires making various unrealistic assumptions concerning other issues. Some of these
assumptions are considered or hoped to be unimportant, again on intuitive grounds. Such
assumptions have been examined in economic methodology using various closely related
terms such as Musgrave’s (1981) heuristic assumptions, Mäki’s (2000) early step
assumptions, Hindriks’ (2006) tractability assumptions and Alexandrova’s (2006)
derivational facilitators. We will examine the relationship between such assumptions and
robustness in economic model-building by way of discussing a case: geographical
economics. We will show that an important way in which economists try to guard against
errors in modeling is to see whether the model’s conclusions remain the same if some
auxiliary assumptions, which are hoped not to affect those conclusions, are changed. The
case also demonstrates that although the epistemological functions of guarding against
error and securing claims concerning the relative importance of various assumptions are
somewhat different, they are often closely intertwined in the process of analyzing the
robustness of some modeling results.
The structure of the paper is the following. Section 2 provides an introductory discussion
of the notion of robustness. Section 3 explains why robustness is more important in
4economics than in some other sciences. Section 4 addresses the criticism that robustness
is a non-empirical form of confirmation, and highlights the role of robustness in empirical
testing. Section 5 presents our case. Section 6 addresses the criticisms levelled against
robustness by discussing the independence of auxiliary assumptions. Section 6 further
clarifies our account of derivational robustness by distinguishing it from other
conceptions. Section 7 draws more general conclusions about the way in which the
importance and rationale of robustness analysis should change our perception of the role
of theory in economics. Section 8 concludes the paper.
2. Making sense of robustness
As  Wimsatt  uses  the  term,  robustness  means  stability  of  a  result  under  different  and
independent forms of determination, such as methods of observation, measurement,
experiment or mathematical derivation. Robustness provides consilience via
triangulation;  a  result  is  deemed  real  or  reliable  because  a  number  of  different  and
mutually independent routes lead to the same conclusion. If these separate ways of
determination are indeed independent of each other, it would be a remarkable
coincidence that they yield a similar conclusion if the conclusion does not correspond to
something real.
Wimsatt refers to all methods of using various types of robustness considerations for
distinguishing the real from the artifactual as robustness analysis. An important mode of
robustness analysis is experimental triangulation. By performing experiments relying on
different techniques and background theories, scientists can make sure that a putative
phenomenon (as in Bogen and Woodward 1988) of interest is not merely an artefact of a
particular experimental set-up. Similarly, different modes of measurement producing
coherent results provide evidence for the existence of a single property that these
different measurements are getting at. In philosophy of science, the multiple
determination of Avogadro’s constant provides the most celebrated example of such an
“argument from coincidence”. It exemplifies both these kinds of empirical robustness,
5and is taken to provide irrefutable grounds for the reality of molecules (Hacking 1983 54-
55; Salmon 1984 214-220) .
Every experimental set-up and means of measurement has errors and biases. Sometimes
we have prior knowledge of some of these problems, but there is always an element of
residual uncertainty concerning the validity of an experiment or a measurement.
Independent ways of determining the same result reduce the probability of erroneous
results due to errors or biases in individual ways of arriving at the result. Fallible
thinkers are better off avoiding long deductive chains because the chain as a whole is
always weaker than its weakest link. In the case of multiple and independent ways of
determination, the end-result is more secure than even the strongest individual reasoning.
(Wimsatt 1987)
The required independence of the ways of determination can be spelled out using this
error-avoidance viewpoint. In order for two or more ways of determination to provide
epistemic security in the form of robustness, they should not share the same errors and
biases in the light of prior knowledge. If a given method of determination is independent
of another, its probability of failing to reach the correct result should not depend on
whether the other one fails. Independence of errors therefore means that given that the
result holds (or that it does not hold), the successes of the individual ways of
determination in arriving at the result are independent of each other. Let DETn be random
variables expressing whether a method of determination n produces the result of interest
R and RES a random variable expressing whether the result R actually holds or not.
Independence of ways of determination can be defined using probabilistic independence
as DET1?DET2 …?DETn|RES.1 If the methods of determination are independent in this
sense and more reliable than pure chance, it is easy to show that observing multiple
independent results should increase our belief in R. (Bovens and Hartmann 2003, p. 96-
97)
1 Note that independence required by robustness is not to be equated with (Bayesian) confirmational
independence, which requires that the confirmation received by a hypotheses H from a piece of evidence
E1 is independent of another piece of evidence E2 (cf. Fitelson 2001).
63. Robustness in economics
Economics is not so much concerned with experimentation or measurement as with
building analytically solvable mathematical models. These models are always based on
various idealizations and abstractions, which make at least some of their assumptions
unrealistic. Even a perfect economic model is idealized (Lehtinen and Kuorikoski
forthcoming), since the point of economic models is to capture only the most important
causal mechanisms and relationships. In physics, fundamental theories can in principle be
used to determine how much distortion is introduced by each idealization (cf. Odenbaugh
2005; Weisberg 2006b). In contrast, in economics there is no such fundamental theory
that tells the modeler which assumptions provide cause for alarm and which do not, and
how one should go about making the models more realistic.
While economists cannot rely on theoretical frameworks for determining the importance
of various idealizing assumptions, they may often resort to intuitive notions of
realisticness. Economic models can be made more realistic in a variety of ways. These
include, but are not restricted to, taking into account a factor which was previously
neglected, providing links between variables that were already incorporated in the model,
relaxing simplifying assumptions, restricting the domain of application (Levins 1993),
specifying in more detail institutional or other contextual factors, and providing a more
realistic account of individual behavior by allowing deviations from rationality or by
allowing incomplete information. In some cases it is not clear what it would mean to
replace a specific modeling assumption, such as a parameter value or a functional form,
with a more realistic one.
Non-economists are often annoyed be the economists’ seemingly sanguine attitude
towards criticisms of unrealistic assumptions in their models: such criticisms are taken
seriously, i.e. published in economic journals, only if they are accompanied with an
alternate formal model that either shows how a modified assumption changes the
conclusions of the previous model or shows that it does not change them. Economists
obtain important information in both cases. If modifying an auxiliary assumption changes
the result, the reason for the divergence of results can be traced to the difference between
7the original and the alternate model. If modifying the assumption does not change the
result, this gives at least some assurance that the particular idealizations used in the two
models are not crucially responsible for the results.
The existence of this practice (of requiring that a formal model be joined to criticisms of
model-assumptions) provides evidence for our claim that economics is a  form  of
robustness analysis. If mere unrealisticness of an assumption were sufficient to invalidate
a model, it would be perfectly justifiable to accept verbal criticisms of assumptions. If it
were easy to know which assumptions are realistic and which matter for the model-
results, requiring a formal proof of non-robustness would be unnecessary.2 The existence
of this crucial methodological practice is thus premised on the importance of epistemic
uncertainty concerning the consequences of unrealistic assumptions and the concomitant
importance of robustness considerations and robustness analysis (see also Gibbard and
Varian 1978).
When we say that economics is robustness analysis, we mean that model-building
typically proceeds in such a way that some assumptions of an already existing model are
modified in some respects. The modified model is often, though not necessarily,
presented by a different individual economist. To be more precise, then, our claim is that
economics is collective derivational robustness analysis.
A few comments are in order here. Michael Weisberg’s (2006) account of robustness
analysis contains four ‘steps’: 1) determine whether a set of models imply a common
result 2) analyse whether this set has a common structure 3) formulate the robust theorem
4) conduct stability analysis to see what conditions defeat the connection between the
common structure and the robust property. According to our account, there is no need for
an individual economist to intentionally conduct robustness analysis. It is sufficient that
someone presents an alternate model, and that this model retains some of the original
assumptions. Furthermore, given that our factual claim concerns derivational robustness,
2 As pointed out by Lehtinen and Kuorikoski (2007) showing that some particular results are not robust
with respect to a crucial assumption such as rationality immediately provides entry to even the most
prestigious journals.
8there is no need to require that stability analysis be conducted to justify calling the
practice robustness analysis. Admittedly, when economists talk about robustness analysis,
they often mean specific methods such as perturbation analysis or sensitivity analysis.
Our definition clearly covers a broader range of activities than using these methods. We
decline from providing neologisms for economists’ practices, however, because we think
that Woodward’s term “derivational robustness” already captures its essence. Nancy
Cartwright (2006) has argued that there is a grave need to conduct robustness analysis
with respect to what she calls (after McMullin 1985) non-Galilean assumptions in
economics models, namely those assumptions that do not  participate in isolating a core
causal mechanism, but that this is not done. If non-Galilean assumptions closely resemble
tractability (or heuristic, or early step etc.) assumptions, we disagree about Cartwright’s
factual claim: economists do seem to be interested in changing tractability assumptions
just as the Galilean assumptions. Our illustration, Geographical economics, is just one
example. It is again important to bear in mind that what economists often call robustness
analysis is not what we mean by this term.
4. The epistemic import of robustness analysis
The widespread view about derivational robustness is that it is empirically vacuous and
that it constitutes a suspicious form of pseudo confirmation (Cartwright 1991; Orzack and
Sober 1993; Sugden 2000). Empirical data is obviously the natural arbiter for evaluating
the validity of theories. Even so, lacking access to the kind of data that would
straightforwardly bear on whether a certain modelling result is accurate, it may be
justifiable to use robustness analysis. Since the economic models are based on
empirically dubious assumptions and some branches of economics have been criticized
for the lack of empirical testing (Blaug 1980; Green and Shapiro 1994), the accusation of
empirical emptiness of robustness is indeed more relevant in economics than in other
fields.
According to Sugden, robustness analysis is a matter of comparisons between models,
and thus does not licence ‘the inductive leap’ from models to economic reality. Similarly,
9Orzack and Sober (1993) maintain that ‘it is worth considering the possibility that
robustness simply reflects something common among the frameworks and not something
about the world those frameworks seek to describe’ (p. 539). Here is how they formulate
their argument:
Suppose that each of two competing models is reasonably well supported by the data. If R
is a robust theorem that they share, should we conclude that the data support the common
element in the two models? Presumably, if the data had been different, we would not have
regarded the models as well supported. The question is whether we would be prepared to
doubt R in this circumstance as well. If not, then this robust theorem is not tested by the
data and consequently is not well supported by them … the robustness of R is not by itself a
reason to believe it. Whether R is plausible depends on the data and not on the fact that R is
robust … Testability of predictions … depends upon having nonrobust theorems to test, that
is, those that are not entailed by all of the models under test (pp. 540-1).
Their claim is thus that it is the data rather than the robustness that does the confirming,
or else the result is simply unfalsifiable and thus empirically empty. While we agree with
them that robustness analysis does not by itself provide empirical confirmation, we think
that their account provides a misleading view of the importance and role of robustness for
empirical tests.
In our view, Orzack and Sober’s example actually shows how robustness considerations
are crucial in determining what can be confirmed with given data. Their argument rests
on a crucial ambiguity: they do not specify what is meant by the claim that two models
are supported by some data. Orzack and Sober seem to take the Duhem-Quine thesis
literally and think that a theory or a model is confirmed or disconfirmed only as a whole
– the only question is whether the model fits the data. But an additional inferential step is
needed to claim that a model says anything interesting about the phenomenon on the
basis of its fit to a set of data. If two models are actually in competition but cannot be
distinguished empirically, i.e. if they stand and fall together given the kind of data
available, then the only thing that can be tested against the data is what they have in
common, including the robust theorem. Robustness analysis is thus necessary for
determining which part of the models is confirmed. Confirmation may concern the
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assumptions of the model, or the consequences of those assumptions. We are often
interested in knowing that the causally important parts of our models, rather than the
unimportant auxiliary assumptions, are confirmed or disconfirmed. Testability of parts of
models requires robustness because, unless we know which conclusions are common to
the two models, it is impossible to say which parts of the models are supported by the
data. If there were a direct empirical test of whether the result of interest holds,
conducting it would obviously be the thing to do. Robustness analysis is about the
assessment of the security of our inferences from uncertain assumptions and is relevant
precisely when there is no direct way of empirically ascertaining whether the conclusions
of our inferences are true.
Now suppose that two models M1 =(C&V1&V3)  and  M2=(C&V2&V3), consisting of a
common theoretical element C and variable auxiliary assumptions Vi, have a common
consequence RM, and that given their differences, they also have consequences not
common to the two models, RM1 and RM2, respectively. Initially there is a set of data E
that supports the common consequence RM. The models can be assumed to be empirically
equivalent with respect to this consequence. Suppose that we then obtain new evidence
E1 which is consistent with RM, and RM1 but not with RM2. Then we have learned that the
data supports C&V1&V3 but  not  C&V2&V3. Because of the common and empirically
supported implication, we now have a prima facie reason to suspect that there is
something wrong specifically with V2. Since we could not have made this inference
without there being nonrobust implications, testability requires nonrobust theorems, just
as Orzack and Sober argue. However, it also requires robust elements. To see this,
consider a scenario in which we start with M1 =(C&V1&V3)  and M2=(C&V2&V3), and
we know that RM1 is derivable from M1 and that RM2 is derivable from M2, but we do not
know whether RM1 is derivable from M2 and whether RM2 is derivable from M1.
Furthermore, empirical evidence E supports both RM1 and RM2. If we then find out that
RM1 is not consistent with M2, M2 is falsified (since it cannot be consistent with E). The
question, then, is what we can say about the assumptions in the two models without
finding out whether RM2 is  a  common consequence of  the two models.  Only if  we find
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that  RM2 is consistent also with M1 can we say that  V2 was the culprit. Testability thus
requires both robust and nonrobust elements.
Another vocal critic of the evidential value of robustness is Nancy Cartwright. She argues
(Cartwright 1991) that if different econometricians use different functional forms for
deriving the same results, this proves nothing about the truth of the theorems derived. She
argues that if we look at thirty different functional forms, but ‘God’s function is number
thirty-one, the first thirty do not teach us anything’. Cartwright’s criticism is based on the
idea that a perfect model exists, one that provides the-whole-truth and nothing-but-the-
truth (cf. Teller 2001). This must be so because otherwise it would not be possible to
imagine that only one functional form describes reality. In physics, the idea of the one
true functional form might be plausible in some modeling situations, but economics deals
with complex phenomena within open systems characterized by heterogeneity and
transient parameter values. For many auxiliary assumptions, there simply is no unique
true formulation or value.
Cartwright argues that the inference based on robustness analysis does indeed lend
credence to a robust theorem if we have some independent knowledge that the different
functional forms have some common properties. Yet, if we already know that some
functional form should have a certain property and that the result depends on this
property, what is the point of doing robustness analysis? It is precisely when we lack such
knowledge that robustness analysis provides us epistemically relevant information. The
whole point of robustness analysis is to determine which factors are really important and
which not. Thus, to show that a result can be derived with two or more functional forms
gives us assurance that what was believed to be irrelevant to the question under study – in
this case factors encoded in the different functional forms – is indeed irrelevant. What is
important for robustness analysis is not which functional form, if any, is the true one, but
rather that the truth or falsity of the different functional forms does not matter. As Levins
puts it, the point of robustness analysis is to determine the extent we can get away with
not knowing all the details and still understand the system (Levins 1993, 554).
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Levins’ original account makes clear that the point with robustness lies precisely in the
idea that all models are strictly speaking false, if falsity means the absence of the-whole-
truth and nothing-but-the-truth.3 Once we discard the received view of theories as
axiomatic logical systems and switch to speaking more generally about models as more
or less accurate representations, it is easy to see that the notions of truth or falsity of a
model provide merely the extreme points for (at least) two dimensions of partial truth:
comprehensiveness and accuracy of representations. Talk of truth or falsity simpliciter
does not make much sense in the world of models. For our purposes, it is not necessary to
provide an extensive account of partial truth. All we need is the idea that models as well
as their individual assumptions may approximate truth to various degrees.4 The usual
case is one in which we know that all the models are false in the sense that they contain
various idealisations and abstractions and are thus not completely true. Yet they all might
contain a grain of truth, and we do not know which combination of auxiliary assumptions
provides a model that is closest to the truth. More importantly, before conducting
robustness analysis, we do not know whether a result depends on the different auxiliary
assumptions or not: we do not know the epistemic status of the theorem. When we
discover that a result is implied by multiple models, we can be more confident that it does
not depend on the idealisations we have made (2006a). Although it does not provide a
means of finding causally  important  mechanisms,  robustness  analysis  serves  to
distinguish the causally important mechanisms from the irrelevancies (see also
Odenbaugh 2005). When a scientist constructs a model, he or she tries to incorporate the
important causal factors and leave out the irrelevancies. If a model fails to depict the
important factors, it will not give a truthful view of the situation even if its results are
robust with respect to many auxiliary assumptions. The contribution that robustness
analysis provides is that it allows the modeler to be just a little bit more certain that what
he or she hoped is irrelevant is in fact irrelevant.
3 This distinction was proposed in Sen (1980). See Mäki (1992; 1994a) for further analysis.
4 The failure of the framework provided by French and da Costa (2003) to do this in a reasonable way is the
reason we are not using it here (see Pincock 2005) .
13
5. An illustration: geographical economics models
Geographical economics (henceforth GeoEcon) is a recent approach to spatial issues
developed within economics that endeavours to explain the spatial location of economic
activity. Krugman (1991) provides the first and the core model.5 Following its
appearance, a growing theoretical literature refines and extends this original stylized
model. The CP model and its close follow-ups (summarized in Fujita, Krugman and
Venables1999) depends crucially on a set of unrealistic assumptions, or “modeling
tricks”, as geographical economists sometimes refer to them. To turn a set of interesting
examples (or  a  collection  of  special  cases)  into  a  general  theory  of  the  location  of
economic activity, geographical economists engage in what we identified as robustness
analysis: many of the subsequent GeoEcon models serve the function of checking
whether the main conclusions of the CP model remain valid when some of the unrealistic
assumptions are altered. We begin by briefly setting out the main elements of the core
model, and then look at a few GeoEcon models that explore the robustness of its results.
Krugman (1991) employs the Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) general equilibrium model of
monopolistic competition with transportation costs and labor mobility to derive a core-
periphery pattern, that is, a situation in which the bulk of economic activity is located in
one region. In particular, the model makes the following assumptions: There are two
regions, identical in all respects, and two sectors in the economy. The perfectly
competitive (agricultural) sector employs unskilled labor, which is distributed equally
between the two regions and cannot move across regions. The monopolistically
competitive (manufacturing) sector uses only one input, skilled labor, which can move
across regions, and produces a variety of a differentiated product (one per firm).
Consumers love variety, that is, their utility increases not only with the amount of a given
variety consumed, but also with the number of varieties available at their location. This
preference is expressed by a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) utility function that
is symmetric in a bundle of differentiated products. The trade of the manufacturing good
produced is subject to transportation costs. In order to avoid modeling a separate sector,
5 Krugman’s (1991) model is often referred to as the CP model (C for ‘core’ and P for ‘periphery’).
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the cost of transporting goods is assumed to be of the Samuelsonian iceberg form: a
fraction of the good transported melts away in transit.
In this setting, the distribution of the manufacturing sector across the two locations is
determined by the balance between centripetal and centrifugal forces. This can be seen as
the core causal mechanism. The centripetal force is constituted be the circular causation
of forward and backward linkages: because of increasing returns and transportation costs,
firms have an incentive to locate in the larger market for their product in order to
economize on transportation costs, and workers/consumers have an incentive to locate
where the producers of manufacturing goods are, in order to economize on living costs
and to benefit from variety. This creates a process of circular causation: the more firms
and workers there are in the region, the more attractive the region becomes for further
firms and workers (market-size effect). The centripetal force is counteracted by the need
to serve the immobile factor which remains equally distributed across the two regions and
by market-crowding effects: in the larger region, firms face higher competition and
higher input prices.
The result [R] of the model is that agglomeration is more likely to occur in sectors where
increasing returns are intense, market power is strong, and transportation costs are low.
Lower transportation costs, strong market power and intense increasing returns in fact
reduce the effects of market crowding, and hence of the centrifugal force vis-à-vis the
centripetal force. Importantly, the CP model shows that changes of transportation costs
affect the balance between centripetal and centrifugal forces in non-linear way
(seeOttaviano 2003). 6
6The CP model also displays two important qualitative features: (i) catastrophic agglomeration, that is, a
small change in the critical parameters can tip the economy from a situation of dispersion to one of full
agglomeration, and (ii) locational hysteresis or path-dependency, that is, transitory shocks can have
permanent effects.  These two features are generally regarded as distinctive of the GeoEcon approach. But
Puga (1999) shows that the existence of congestion in the agglomerating region can render the transition
from dispersion to agglomeration gradual, and the same happens if some heterogeneity were introduced
across firms. Ottaviano et al. (2002) predict catastrophic agglomeration without hysteresis. In these cases
however an economic explanation for the different results is given.
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The  core  model  relies  on  very  specific  functional  forms  for  utility  (namely,  CES
functions) and production functions (a homothetic function where skilled labor is the only
input), and iceberg transportation technology. These assumptions are made mainly for
convenience or mathematical tractability, and it is hoped that the results [R] do not
crucially depend on this specific set of assumptions.7
Later models explore the robustness of the properties and results of the CP model. In
particular, Ottaviano, Tabuchi and Thisse (2002) employ quadratic sub-utilities instead of
CES functions, and assume linear instead of iceberg transportation costs. In contrast to
the CP model, these assumptions entail that demand- and substitution elasticities that
vary with prices, and rather than being fixed by a markup rule (as in the CP model),
equilibrium prices depend on the fundamentals of the market. The main conclusions of
the CP model, however, are found to be robust in spite of these changes. Ottaviano et al.
(2002, p. 432) conclude that “The main results in the literature do not depend on the
specific modeling choices made, as often argued by their critics. In particular, the
robustness of the results obtained in the CP model against an alternative formulation of
preferences and transportation seem to point to the existence of a whole class of models
for which similar results would hold.”
A series of models (Forslid and Ottaviano 2003; Ottaviano and Robert-Nicoud 2006;
Ottaviano 2007), labeled Footloose Entrepreneurs (FE), derive a core-periphery pattern
driven by mobility of labor, as in the CP model, but assume a different specification of
the production function. Whereas the core model uses a homothetic function in which
only skilled labor appears, FE models use the Flam and Helpman (1987) functional form,
which assumes that firms use both skilled and unskilled labor. This change has a
significant implication. In the core model, free entry determines the size of the firms, and
hence the number of firms functions as the adjustment variable. In the FE models, the
number of firms varies with wage instead. The FE models nonetheless derive the same
qualitative results as the CP models: agglomeration is positively affected by the intensity
7 Notice that even with these simplifications, deriving the results of the core model still requires resorting to
numerical computations.
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of the increasing returns, and negatively affected by the level of transportation costs and
market power.8
The models whose results are found to be robust share a set of substantive assumptions.
Despite modifications to some components of the core model, a set of ingredients remain
invariant across these alternative frameworks: the presence of firm-specific economies of
scale, imperfect competition, transportation costs and labor mobility, giving rise to the
centrifugal and centripetal forces. The theoretical claim of the GeoEcon models is that it
is this common set of substantive assumptions, the core causal mechanism, that is
responsible for the same result [R] derived across different models. A series of recent
works demonstrate that the main models of GeoEcon are isomorphic at equilibrium in a
meaningful state space, and this purportedly explains why, despite differences in their
functional specifications, they obtain the same qualitative results. Robert-Nicoud (2005)
shows this to be the case for models assuming labor mobility, namely the CP model
(Krugman 1991) and FE model (Forslid and Ottaviano 2003).
To understand the role of robustness analysis, it is useful to look at modifications of the
models where robustness breaks down. For example, Ottaviano and Thisse (2004) show
that more realistic models that include an additional spatial cost (for example, congestion
or transport costs for the good of the agricultural sector) demonstrate that the value of the
transport cost relative to this additional spatial cost is crucial for determining whether
dispersion or agglomeration occurs. For instance, adding transport costs for the
agricultural good changes the qualitative results [R] of the CP model. In such model,
when the transport cost for the agricultural good is low, agglomeration occurs for
intermediate levels of the transport cost of the manufacturing good, as in the CP model.
But, in contrast to the CP model, when the cost of transporting the agricultural good is
high, industry is always dispersed for high levels of the cost of transporting the
manufacturing good.
8 The core model states that: )]([)(( ixFwixC ??? , where x(i) is the firm output, F is the fixed labour
requirement, ?  is the variable labour requirement, and w is the skilled labour wage. The Flam and
Helpman functional form is: )()(( ixwwFixC u??? , where wu is the unskilled labour wage rate.
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However, the divergence of results is not taken to invalidate the theoretical claim
connecting the core mechanism of the CP model to [R].9 The  reason  is  that  there  is  an
economic explanation for the divergent results. First, dispersion (and not agglomeration)
now occurs for low transportation costs of the manufacturing good because the price
differential of the agricultural good constitutes a further centrifugal force that was absent
in the CP model. More importantly, for high transportation costs, the centrifugal force
(the crowding effect on the market for the manufacturing good) is exactly the same as in
the CP model. This confirms that, in the absence of a significant additional cost, the
relationship between high transport costs of the manufacturing good and dispersion is as
predicted in the CP model. Second, the result that industry is always dispersed when the
costs of shipping the traditional good is high is taken to show that “the level of the
agricultural good’s transport costs matters for the location of industrial firms.” (Ottaviano
and Thisse 2004, p. 35). This finding is consistent with the claim that robustness analysis
serves to track the relative importance of various parts of theoretical models, and to
discriminate between potentially relevant causal factors from causally irrelevant ones.
The breakdown of robust conclusions does not constitute a problem as long as it can be
given a plausible economic interpretation. Whether this economic interpretation is correct
is an empirical matter, and so it should be ultimately determined. As claimed above,
robustness analysis does not constitute a form of empirical validation. The important
point, however, is that if there is no economic explanation for the break-down of the
robust conclusions, there is little reason to confront the models with empirical evidence;
they are regarded as epistemically worthless.
To see more precisely the difference between the case in which the results changed, and
the one in which they did not, it is useful to distinguish between two categories of
9 U-shaped relationship between transport costs and agglomeration versus ?-type relationship. The bell-
shape relationship also occurs when there are input-output linkages and labor is immobile; when there are
urban crowding costs; or when there is heterogeneity in migration behavior. The bell-shaped relationship
also corresponds to a stylized fact (the bell-shaped curve of spatial development): a core-periphery pattern
emerges in early stages of development, but as development proceeds, the core and the periphery (urban-
rural areas) converge.
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auxiliary assumptions: idealizing assumptions about factors known or presumed to have
an impact on the phenomenon (to be relaxed at later stages), and very specific modeling
assumptions that are made for mathematical convenience and are hoped to be innocuous
or irrelevant for the economic result of the model (tractability assumptions or derivation
facilitators). The practice of model building in economics seems to be such that
assumptions of the first kind are relaxed for the sake of increased realisticness, increased
applicability of the model, or better predictions. The breakdown of robust results in this
case confirms the belief that the factor in question does have an impact on the
phenomenon, and the model is used to study how the introduction of the new factor
affects the working of the mechanism and hence the conclusions of the model.
Tractability assumptions instead are typically replaced with different unrealistic
assumptions, that is, assumptions that are false in a different way. The failure of
robustness with respect to tractability assumptions is problematic because it shows that
the result is an artifact of the specific set of tractability assumptions. Instead, if a result
turns out to be robust, the dependency between the set of substantive economic
assumptions and the result gets an extra hedge in terms of credibility. This is what we
have identified as the function of guarding against errors: robustness analysis guards
against unknown consequences of assumptions that are hoped to be innocuous. The
different roles played by alternative specifications of functional forms and technologies
in GeoEcon exemplify this practice and its function very clearly.
6. Independence of derivations
Robustness confers credibility to a result if the ways of determination with respect to
which the result is robust are independent from each other. Thus, as Orzack and Sober
(1993) have pointed out, the intelligibility of the concept of robustness crucially depends
on the possibility of giving an account of the independence of the ways of determination.
Existing discussion on the independence in robustness analysis seems to take it for
granted that independence is a matter of independence between models (see Orzack and
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Sober 1993).  What does independence between models mean? To be sure, it cannot
mean that any two models taken to be independent do not share any assumptions or
variables. If it did, it would be very difficult to find independent models. Orzack and
Sober discuss what they call logical independence, which has to do with the truth values
of models, and statistical independence. The problem with these suggestions is that they
do  not  seem  to  be  very  well  suited  for  analysing  models  (in  the  sense  in  which
economists talk about models, not in the sense of how they are understood in the
semantic view); models are very seldom logically independent from each other because
they do not have clearly defined truth-values in the first place, or are always false, and
assigning probabilities to the truth of models does not seem reasonable either. However,
Orzack and Sober are right about the fact that Levins' notion of robustness does not really
incorporate the independence assumption. When Levins discusses robustness, he refers to
the idea that robust theorems are those that share the biological assumptions (1966;
1968). Beyond noting that the various models share the biological assumptions, he does
not say very much about what the common part of a set of models is supposed to be. It
may consist of a specification of a mechanism, or perhaps even a full-fledged theory.
Something similar is going on in economic models. As exemplified by the GeoEcon case,
different economic models share some substantive economic assumptions, possibly those
that specify the core mechanism, but not all.
Let us express Levins’ conception of robustness as follows:10 Let C&Vi denote a model
Mi that is based on combining the common part of the set of models with the specific part
Vi. Let A?B denote ‘B is derivable from A’ (within some standard formal system).
Robustness of the relationship C? RM requires that
    (C&V?)? RM, and
10 Levins (1993) proposes to evaluate robustness with the following framework. Let RM denote a robust
theorem. Let C denote the common part of all models in some set of models M. Let Vi denote the variable
part of the models. Then, if
CV1+CV2+…=C(V1+V2+…)? RM,
and if the set of Vi's is exhaustive, then (V1+V2+…)=1, and C? RM. Since Levins does not define the
addition sign (+) in this formalism, it is difficult to tell what exactly is being claimed.
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    (C&V?)? RM, and...
    (C&Vn)? RM.
Robustness of the derivation is hardly interesting if RM can be derived without making
any auxiliary assumptions, it is therefore natural to think that ~(C?  RM), although this is
not a formal requirement of robustness. Levins’ treatment of robustness gives the
impression that the set of auxiliary assumptions must be exhaustive, but we think this is
too restrictive. In practice the typical case is one in which it is not possible to define an
exhaustive set of possible auxiliary assumptions. Allowing for a non-exhaustive set
weakens the degree to with which each derivation, which use a different set of auxiliary
assumptions, shows that the relationship is robust, but it does not remove the epistemic
relevance of such derivations altogether.
It is important to realize that even though the various models in M are not independent
from each other because they share some assumptions, it is the independence of
individual assumptions in models that is really crucial for derivational robustness. As
Wimsatt (1980, p. 310) notes, the models must be similar so that we can compare them,
and isolate their similarities and differences. What a robust theorem claims is that the
result RM depends on some central mechanism C, irrespective of the details of the other
assumptions in the models. Levins' (1966, p. 126) unclear but intuitive claim that 'our
truth is the intersection of independent lies' can be taken to mean that the fact that result
RM can be derived from mechanism C does not depend on the various auxiliary
assumptions used in the derivation. Various falsities involved in the different possible
derivations do not matter because we know that result RM does not depend on the
falsehoods. In other words, since the result RM can be derived with all possible
falsehoods V1,...,Vn, their falsehood does not matter. In the GeoEcon case, we saw that
changing the specifications of functional forms and technologies, while retaining the
assumptions depicting the core causal mechanism, yielded the same qualitative
conclusions. The derivation of [R] from different sets of unrealistic assumptions increases
the confidence that [R] depends on the core economic mechanism rather than on specific
unrealistic modeling choices.
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Our discussion has so far centered on the role of robustness analysis in assessing the
relative importance of modeling assumptions. The question that remains is whether
Levinsian robustness analysis can be conceived as a species of general robustness
analysis and whether the same epistemic rationale applies to it. What is needed is an
account of how the different auxiliary modeling assumptions (V1…Vn) could be thought
of  as  not  sharing  the  same  biases  and  other  sources  of  possible  error.  In  general,
robustness required that the success of ways of determination be independent given
knowledge of whether the result holds (DET1?DET2 …?DETn|RES). If we plug in the
models,  we  get  ((C&V1?? RM ? (C&V2?? RM…? (C&Vn?? RM|  RM). The problem is
that ((C&Vn?? RM) are not random variables. Talk of reliability, biases and errors seems
out of place here since we are dealing with logical relations of formal derivability, not
causal processes of measurement or experimentation. Whether a relation of derivability
holds cannot be a matter of probabilities.
Our proposal for solving this problem is to go subjectivist and relativise the epistemic
gain from robustness to the epistemic situation of the modeler or the relevant scientific
community at a certain time. Modeling is an act of inference from a set of substantial
assumptions to a conclusion. However, this process of inference usually requires
additional auxiliary assumptions to be feasible. These auxiliary assumptions can lead the
process of inference astray in the sense that it leads to a conclusion that is contrary to the
substantial assumptions. In this sense, auxiliary assumptions can induce errors in the
modeling process. For robustness considerations to be meaningful in the context of
formal modeling, it is sufficient that the person deriving robust theorems does not have
reasons to believe that the auxiliary assumptions will systematically lead astray.
Similarly, independence means that the modeler should have no positive reasons to
believe that if one of the auxiliary assumptions induces a significant error in the result, so
does another one. Given that the modeling result of interest (RM) is correct, the prior
probabilities concerning whether RM can be derived from C&V1 or C&V2…C&Vn should
be independent. In the GeoEcon case, if assuming CES or quadratic utility functions had
exactly the same mathematical implications, then they would not be independent in that
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they would induce the same kind of falsehood to the model. Instead, CES utility functions
and sub-quadratic utility functions are known to be independent at least in the weak sense
that neither is a special case of the other. Quadratic utility functions, for instance, entail
that demand and substitution elasticities vary with prices (in the CES variant, they do not
) and equilibrium prices depend on the fundamentals of the market (in the CES variant,
they do not).
In sum, economic models in a given sub-field are often far from independent because
they usually differ only with respect to a few particular modeling assumptions.
Robustness analysis in economics is thus usually a special, degenerate form of general
robustness analysis in Wimsatt’s sense: testing the robustness of a result with respect to a
particular modeling assumption which is usually obviously unrealistic. If a modeling
result is robust with respect to particular modeling assumptions, the empirical falsity of
these particular assumptions does not provide grounds for criticizing the result. As Kent
Staley (2004) puts it, the evidence provided by the model is more secure against false
assumptions. Thus analytical robustness can provide epistemic credence for the reality of
an economic phenomenon corresponding to the modeling result, at least in this purely
negative manner. In the analogous case of robustness of an empirical result under
independent experimental procedures, the support is stronger if we know or have positive
reasons to believe that the procedures are causally or statistically independent in the sense
that they do not share the same characteristic errors. If we merely have no particular
positive reasons to believe them to be dependent, the credibility conferred by different
ways of determination is obviously weaker, but not non-existent.
Orzack and Sober are of course right in claiming that purely analytic robustness analysis
itself does not provide empirical confirmation, since no new observations are made.
However, the value of analytic robustness analysis lies in rooting out error from our
inferences from diverse and uncertain assumptions to conclusions. If these assumptions
have no empirical merit in the first place, then clearly robustness has no epistemic value –
it is just a similarity relation between members of a peculiar set of abstract entities. But in
case of economics, this would amount to claiming that economic modeling assumptions
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did not have any empirical content in the first place. Although this is a remotely plausible
view that may even have been entertained, it is clearly a rather extreme position.
7. Economics as a Babylonian science
Viewing economic model building as a form of robustness analysis dramatically changes
our perception of the status and role of economic theory. Over the decades, the self-image
of economics has been consciously molded to fit the template of a Millian deductive
science in the sense that economic theorizing is explicitly based on fundamental
economic axioms and logical derivation of empirical results from these axioms. Wimsatt
calls this particular ideal of science Euclidian (1981). However, the former discussion
shows that one of the main epistemic strategies of economics seems to be incoherent with
this image; a situation Rosenberg calls the deepest metaphysical mystery of economics
(Rosenberg 1995). Little interest is shown in empirically securing the foundations of the
theory to the maximum extent, which would be the obvious way for a true Euclidian to
proceed. Indeed, economic model building is notoriously insensitive to repeated
empirical refutations of the rationality axioms supposedly providing the basis for the
whole enterprise. Instead, enormous intellectual effort is poured into analytical
derivations of often familiar results from slightly different assumptions. Rather than a
stubborn metaphysical prejudice, this epistemic strategy is best seen as a form of
robustness analysis, which aims at isolating and providing epistemic credence to
economic phenomena corresponding to the robust results or theorems, not direct
hypothetico-deductive support for a grand axiomatic theory as such. This strategy fits
better with another image of science, one that Richard Feynman (1992 [1965], p. 46) and
Wimsatt (Wimsatt 1981)have called Babylonian.
Economics is a Babylonian science, because it deals with complex phenomena resulting
from underlying diversity, not uniformity. For most economic phenomena of interest,
there simply is no single true functional form decreed by God. The rationality postulates
do not describe invariant natural constants that would provide secure foundations for
modelling if we only could measure them accurately. If there were such invariants, the
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best way to increase reliability would be to eliminate all possible errors concerning the
axioms describing the invariants: if there are no errors in the axioms, there will be no
errors in the whole deductive edifice (cf. Rosenberg 1992 ,chpt. 5). However, since real
economic systems are fundamentally heterogeneous and open, error cannot be so
eliminated. To increase reliability, the next best way is to control for the effects of
inevitable errors. The Babylonian character of economics thus explains the fact that none
of the so called fundamental axioms of economics is truly sacrosanct (cf. Hausman 1992,
52). It also makes it easy to understand why new branches of economics typically start
from a special case which is then generalised and modified (Balzer and Dreier 1999).
In order to control for the epistemic consequences of the inevitable errors in modelling
assumptions, the theoretician is free to violate any axioms she pleases, as long as she is
doing it in a way that helps to locate sources of possible error relevant for the result of
interest, i.e. with an explicit formal model showing how the result of a model depends on
a particular problematic modelling assumption. This epistemic groping is necessary, since
economic theory does not in itself provide much guidance on what kind of idealizations
are fatal to certain empirical conclusions and which are not.
Although many argue for the economic approach on the basis of its unificatory
credentials, the importance of robustness and the Babylonian nature of economics entail
that substantial unification actually increases the susceptibility of the theoretical system
to inevitable errors. If diverse theorems and sub-models are really substantially dependent
on a small set of unifying axioms, the ramifications of errors in the axioms are more
destructive and far reaching (Wimsatt 1981). Instead, the proper function of the theory of
individual utility maximization in its various guises is to be understood with what Boyd
and Richerson (1987) call a generalized sample model. The generalized sample model is
a generalization over more detailed and context sensitive models which are still relatively
simple, but are nonetheless explanatory and perhaps predictive. The role of the
generalized sample theory is not to directly tell the truth about the deepest unified nature
of the variety of more detailed models (as in physics), but rather to help organize
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cognitive work and facilitate communication between specialists. The role of the theory
is to help understand models, not the world.
8. Conclusions
The practice of economic theorizing largely consists of building models with slightly
different assumptions yielding familiar results. We have argued that this practice makes
sense when seen as derivational robustness analysis. Robustness analysis is a sensible
epistemic strategy in situations where we know that our assumptions and inferences are
fallible, but not in what situations and in what way. Derivational robustness analysis
guards against errors in theorizing when the problematic parts of the ways of
determination, i.e. models, are independent of each other. In economics in particular,
proving robust theorems from different models with diverse unrealistic assumptions helps
us to evaluate what results correspond to important economic phenomena and what are
merely artefacts of particular auxiliary assumptions. We have addressed Orzack and
Sober’s criticism against robustness as an epistemically relevant feature by showing that
their formulation of the epistemic situation in which robustness analysis is useful is
misleading. We have also shown that their argument actually shows how robustness
considerations are necessary for evaluating what a given piece of data can support. We
have also responded to Cartwright’s criticism by showing that it relies on an untenable
hope of a completely true economic model.
Viewing economic model building as robustness analysis also helps to make sense of the
role of the rationality axioms that apparently provide the basis of the whole enterprise.
Instead of the traditional Euclidian view of the structure of economic theory, we propose
that economics should be approached as a Babylonian science, where the epistemically
secure parts are the robust theorems and the axioms only form what Boyd and Richerson
call a generalized sample theory, whose the role is to help organize further modelling
work and facilitate communication between specialists.
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